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COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2 
Cognitive Dissonance: A Closer Look at the Spreading of Alternatives 
Abstract: 
According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), choosing between two 
close alternatives can create discomfort because of the conflict involved in rejecting a 
desirable option (if the two choice options are desirable) or in choosing an undesirable 
option (if the choice options are both undesirable). According to dissonance theory, 
individuals try to reduce this discomfort by evaluating chosen options more favorably 
and/or evaluating unchosen options less favorably (a phenomenon known as “spreading 
of alternatives”). Traditional critiques by Bem (1967) and recent critiques by Chen and 
Risen (2010) have challenged the role of dissonance-based discomfort in post-choice 
spreading of alternatives. The current research attempts to address the critiques in two 
ways. First, showing a role for measured discomfort would help to make a case for 
dissonance. Second, previous work using an essay-writing paradigm has found 
dissonance effects to be stronger when the essay is counterattitudinal rather than 
proattitudinal. This suggests that spreading might be more driven by dissonance when 
choosing between two disliked rather than two liked options. Research participants 
evaluated a set of food items and were randomly assigned to make a choice between 
either two equally favorable options or two equally unfavorable options. Attitudes were 
measured before and after the choice, and the level of discomfort was also measured after 
the choice but before the post-choice ratings of the alternatives. Spreading was observed 
for choices between both positive and negative options. Also, as might be predicted from 
dissonance theory, spreading of positive alternatives was driven by shifts in evaluation of 
the rejected more than the chosen option. However, post-choice discomfort did not 
predict spreading. Results supporting dissonance theory and its alternative theories were 
found.  
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Introduction 
Whenever people have to make a decision, such as choosing what to wear or with 
whom to spend time, some choices have multiple options and the consequences must be 
weighed before selecting a decision. As a result, people may face discomfort when 
picking and choosing options. Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory argues that 
people can experience conflict when opting to forego a favorable option or when opting 
to accept an unfavorable option. When this occurs, people become motivated to reduce 
this discomfort after the choice has been made.  
More specifically, the theory states that when individuals have to make a choice, 
have beliefs, or partake an action that contradicts other choices, beliefs, or actions, people 
face a psychological discomfort (i.e., cognitive dissonance). In an attempt to remove this 
discomfort, people will make choices or adjust their beliefs in a way that does not 
contradict other beliefs or choices (Festinger, 1957). The theory posits that in an attempt 
to make cognitions consistent with one another, they are changed. Dissonance can be 
reduced by changing public statements or actions, or through changing private opinions. 
When there is little justification for inconsistent action, such as receiving a trivial reward 
to lie to others in saying that a previous boring task was interesting, opinion change is 
likely (and more likely than if substantial justification – such as adequate compensation   
– is received). This is known as induced compliance. Generally, the less justification for 
engaging in dissonant actions, the more attitude change occurs privately in an attempt to 
reduce the discomfort (Festinger, 1962).  
A classic induced compliance study done by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
predicted that greater awards for behavior (i.e. external motivators) would predict smaller 
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attitude change. They argued that if someone says or acts in a way that contradicts his or 
her attitude, there is attitude change as a result of the discomfort. Additionally, the more 
reward given to change attitudes, the smaller the amount of change is actually done 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Attitude change is driven by unpleasant arousal coming 
from dissonance. Zanna and Cooper (1974) asked or required that participants write a 
counterattitudinal essay. Consistent with dissonance theory, more attitude change 
occurred when free to choose whether to write the essay than when forced to do so. Also, 
when participants could attribute unpleasant arousal to a pill, the dissonance-based 
attitude change (in free choice conditions) did not occur.  
Similar changes in attitudes have also been seen in the free choice paradigm. In 
the seminal research using this paradigm, participants were asked to choose between two 
objects after rating eight objects (Brehm, 1956). Their personal investment in the 
experiment was heightened by instructions that the task was for eight household objects’ 
manufacturers, that the participant would have to spend substantial time using the object, 
and that one of the products would go home with them. Participants rated the objects on 
an eight-point scale of desirability. After rating the eight objects, two items were chosen 
by the researchers and participants were told to select one of them. Dissonance was 
experimentally manipulated by having participants choose between two items that were 
either very closely related (i.e., evaluations differed only slightly), or less closely related 
(i.e., evaluations for the options were more discrepant). Closely related options would 
create more difficult choices, so more discomfort would presumably be experienced if 
choosing between two equally liked or disliked things. Less closely related choices would 
be easy to choose between, so the individual would presumably experience less 
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discomfort.  After the choice, participants were given reports with both positive and 
negative features about the objects and then were asked to rerate the objects. Consistent 
with the theory, results indicated that following a choice between two comparably 
desirable objects, there was a shift in post-choice evaluations such that the chosen and 
unchosen options were rated more positively and negatively, respectively. (No change 
was observed between pre- and post-choice evaluations when the choice was ostensibly 
easy, between two disparately desirable objects.) This “spreading of alternatives” is 
presumed to occur as a way to rationalize the decision and reduce any dissonance 
involved in rejecting a favorable option or accepting an undesirable option (Brehm, 
1956). 
Spreading of alternatives provides a way to reduce the discomfort in a difficult 
decision by rationalizing the choice. Specifically, in order to justify a decision, 
individuals tend to evaluate the chosen option more positively and the rejected option 
more negatively, relative to pre-choice evaluations (Brehm, 1956). Put another way, after 
choosing between two equally favorable options, the person can rationalize the decision 
by giving greater emphasis to the positive attributes of the chosen option and/or the 
negative attributes of the rejected options. This spreading has been seen in other studies, 
such as in Egan, Bloom, and Santos (2010). Egan and colleagues (2010) argued that 
induced preferences showed that in both children and monkeys, rejecting an object under 
induced compliance settings showed spreading, particularly by devaluing the unchosen 
item. 
DeWall, Chester, and White (2015) attempted to see if spreading effects would be 
dulled if participants took acetaminophen (a pain reducer commonly known as Tylenol 
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that has been shown to dull social pain neurologically (DeWall, MacDonald, Webster, 
Masten, Baumeister, Powell, Combs, Schurtz, Stillman, Tice, Eisenberger, 2010). 
Participants either chose between two equally liked tasks after having taken 
acetaminophen or not. When participants had taken the pain reducer, post-choice 
spreading of alternatives was smaller, and the negative experiences of decision making 
(such as social rejection) were also reduced compared to participants who had not taken 
acetaminophen (DeWall et al., 2015). Thus, as the social pain (in this case presumed 
dissonance-based discomfort) was reduced, so was the spreading of alternatives. Thus far, 
this study may be one of the strongest cases for discomfort-driven spreading of 
alternatives. Even so, no direct measure of experienced discomfort was used, so evidence 
for involvement of discomfort is indirect, and the effects of acetaminophen on spreading 
have not been replicated. Thus, additional evidence supporting a role for discomfort in 
spreading of alternatives would be useful.  
Such evidence would be especially useful in light of the ongoing debate over 
whether post-decisional attitude change is or is not about resolving discomfort. 
Alternatives include possibilities that the individual may learn about his or her own 
preferences in the process of making the choice or by observing his or her own behavior. 
Self-perception theory provided one of the earliest general alternatives to Festinger’s 
(1957) theory. Bem (1967) characterized self-perception as an “individual's ability to 
respond differentially to his own behavior and its controlling variables” (p. 184). Bem 
(1967) argued that within the free choice paradigm the observed attitude changes are not 
a result of dissonance, but rather interpersonal judgment that changes before and after the 
choice. That is, according to self-perception theory, there is no tension or aversive state 
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driving the attitude change seen in traditional dissonance studies (Bem, 1967).  Instead, 
self-perception theory would suggest that when spreading occurs, it does so as a result of 
looking at the choice and interpreting the choice as indicative of one’s attitude(s). Put 
another way, if one chooses between (previously equally evaluated) option X and option 
Y and selects the former, the decision maker would infer that he or she must genuinely 
prefer option X (and correspondingly, not prefer option Y) and adjust post-choice 
evaluations accordingly.  
In an attempt to address the debate between the proposed mechanisms of 
dissonance and self-perception, Elliot and Devine (1994) conducted two 
counterattitudinal essay studies. In the first study, Elliot and Devine (1994) showed that 
when discomfort occurred it could be measured, and that participants reduced this 
psychological tension by changing their attitudes in the direction of the attitude-
discrepant behavior in alignment with dissonance theory. In their second experiment, 
researchers examined whether providing writing under free choice conditions would 
provide support for self-perception theory by aiming to see if the removal of choice 
would create more dissonance, which it did not. The participants who freely wrote the 
counterattitudinal essay did have higher levels of dissonance in alignment with 
Festinger’s (1957) theory (Elliot & Devine, 1994).    
Some say that dissonance is more likely to be seen in attitude-discrepant behavior 
when writing an essay that falls in one’s latitude of rejection rather than one’s latitude of 
acceptance. The latitude of rejection provides the range of positions that a person is not 
willing to accept, and when participants write an essay that falls into that latitude, more 
dissonance is experienced than when the same essay position falls in the person’s latitude 
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of acceptance (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). When the position of the essay falls 
within the range that a person is willing to accept (i.e., latitude of acceptance), attitude 
change can also occur, but that change is not due to dissonance. Rather, self-perception 
(i.e., the inference of one’s attitude based on attitude-relevant behaviors; Bem, 1967) is 
thought to be the driving force of attitude change in this context. In the discussion 
section, I revisit the debate between cognitive dissonance and self-perception as the 
impetus of attitude change following attitude-discrepant behavior. 
Little research has examined how the overall favorability of the closely-evaluated 
options plays a role in spreading of alternatives. From a dissonance standpoint, it could 
be that differences in valence of the pair of options could affect the amount of discomfort 
that is experienced. Having to choose between two equally liked options (where neither 
option is a bad one) might not create as much dissonance as when a person has to choose 
between two equally disliked things (where neither option has much in the way of 
positive features). Such a pattern would parallel the results seen in previous studies 
(Fazio et. al, 1977) where dissonance plays less of a role when accepting attitudes that 
align with essays written in one’s latitude of acceptance rather than accepting attitudes 
consistent with an essay written in their latitude of rejection. In general, it makes sense 
that less dissonance might be created when accepting a positive (within the latitude of 
acceptance) rather than accepting a negative (one in the latitude of rejection). However, 
recent criticisms by Chen and Risen (2010) have made a unique argument against a role 
for dissonance in the free choice paradigm. Chen and Risen (2010) state that spreading 
can occur in the free choice paradigm even without attitude change. That is, even when 
two options are rated equally (especially when those pre-choice ratings are normative 
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ratings rather than those made by the participants themselves), choices may reveal any 
slight differences in existing evaluations, and those evaluations are then clarified in the 
post-choice ratings. Another explanation, according to Chen and Risen (2010), could be 
that the attitude change comes from discovered preferences while making the choice. 
That is, as part of making the choice itself, different features of the options may be 
considered and change attitudes as part of the choice itself (Chen & Risen, 2010). This 
type of “discovered preference” could be similar to effects of writing an essay in one’s 
latitude of acceptance that nonetheless shifts one’s attitudes to become more consistent 
with that essay than it was previously (cf. Fazio et al., 1977). 
Study Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for the current study concerned two focal questions. First, as both 
traditional and recent critiques question the role of dissonance in spreading of 
alternatives, might a stronger case be made for dissonance through measured discomfort 
in this paradigm, as it did in the induced compliance (counter-attitudinal essay writing) 
paradigm (Elliot & Devine, 1994)? Second, might this measured discomfort differ when 
people are deciding between closely evaluated options of different valence? To address 
both, the research measured discomfort and examined discomfort in choices between two 
positive or two negative choice options.  
True to the original free choice paradigm, participants first evaluated a set of 
items before being asked to make a choice between two of them. Unique to the current 
research, the valence (positive or negative) of these options was also taken into account. 
All decisions were constructed to be difficult (i.e., between two equally evaluated 
alternatives). However, to test whether there are different effects of a difficult-yet-
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desirable decision versus a difficult-and-undesirable decision on both dissonance and 
post-decisional attitude change, participants made a choice between two equally liked 
alternatives or between two equally disliked alternatives, respectively.  
Consistent with a role for dissonance in spreading of alternatives, I predicted that 
choice valence would differ by discomfort post-choice. Dissonance-based discomfort 
should positively predict spreading of alternatives based on previous cognitive 
dissonance studies; as more discomfort is present, more spreading of alternatives should 
occur. Thus, it could be that the amount of reported discomfort would predict the amount 
of spreading within negative choice pairs. If such spreading is driven by dissonance, the 
greatest portion of that discomfort may lie in accepting an unwanted option. If so, then 
spreading may be driven by shifts in evaluation of the accepted option more so than shifts 
in evaluation of the rejected option (see Figure 1). Spreading and dissonance might be 
different, however, when choosing between two positive options. In such choices, to the 
extent that dissonance is present, the most dissonance should come from rejecting 
something an individual likes. If rejecting favorable options creates dissonance, then 
spreading might be driven primarily by devaluing rejected positive options (see Figure 1). 
It could be, though, that the role of dissonance is lessened in positive choices, because 
ending up with a desirable option is not a bad outcome.  
Participants first evaluated a set of food items and were randomly assigned to 
make a choice between either two equally favorable options (the positive-choice 
condition) or two equally unfavorable options (the negative-choice condition). After 
initial ratings and the choice, discomfort (used to predict the differences of ratings after 
the choice) was measured, followed by post-choice evaluations. 
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Figure 1. Asymmetrical spreading predictions where more spreading is seen in the negative 
condition. ChoPre and ChoPost represent the chosen item’s pre-choice and post-choice ratings, 
respectively. Similarly, RejPre and RejPost are the rejected item’s pre-choice and post-choice 
ratings.  
 
Methods 
A. Participants and Materials 
Participants were recruited through the Ohio State Department of Psychology’s 
Research Experience Program (REP) for course credit. Four hundred twenty-nine 
participants completed prescreening and were therefore eligible to complete the study. 
From that pool of eligible people, 111 took the lab portion, but seven participants did not 
pass an attention check (in which they reported whether they were or were not paying 
attention) or made food spelling errors that affected the meaning of later questions in the 
study (such as fires for fries). The study was completed using the online software 
Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2016-2017). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 34 (M=19.35, 
SD=2.515). More females (N=76) completed the study than men (N=24).  
B. Procedures 
To create a baseline of attitudes and aid in creating individualized choice pairs ahead 
of the lab session, participants evaluated 37 food items online via a semantic differential 
scale. The baseline ratings were on a 1-7 scale of extremely dislike to extremely like 
(Table 1). 
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In the lab, each participant was told that he or she was participating in a taste test. 
This was done to increase personal relevance and investment overall in alignment with 
Table 1                             
Food Items                    
Food   M     SD 
Almonds   5.196             1.945 
Apple pie  5.541     1.808 
Avocado   4.93     2.086 
Bananas  5.824     1.685 
Black olives   3.278     2.295 
Bran muffin  4.13     2.088 
Cabbage   3.42     1.96 
Carrots  5.579     1.602 
Chicken Pot Pie 4.943     2.137 
Corn   5.459     1.658   
Cottage cheese  3.44     2.275 
Craisins  4.358     2.196 
Dill pickles   4.602     2.234 
Fig newton   4.312     2.12 
Fried chicken  5.248     2.087 
Fries   6.056     1.426 
Grapes   6.284     1.292 
Hard boiled eggs  4.44     2.22 
Jalapeno peppers  3.413     2.274 
Jello   5.05     1.974 
Kale    3.991     2.084 
Muffins   4.46     .535 
Nachos  5.787     1.663 
Peanut butter   5.59     1.845 
Pomegranates   5.22     1.95 
Popcorn   6.09     1.337 
Pound cake   5.61     1.816 
Pretzels   5.908     1.411 
Prunes   2.97     2.025 
Radishes   2.925     1.975 
Raw broccoli   4.63     1.955 
Rice cake   4.973     1.907 
Semisweet chocolate   5.963     1.466 
Strawberries  6.367     1.086 
Trail mix   5.523     1.687 
Tofu    3.505     2.134 
Twinkies   4.296     2.21 
Yogurt   5.807     1.542 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 13 
previous studies (cf. Harmon-Jones et. al., 1996). In order to examine food ratings in the 
same laboratory taste test setting as for the post-choice ratings, participants also made 
pre-choice ratings in the lab. That is, under the ruse of the taste test, participants were 
told that in order to assist the researchers in choosing the most appropriate food option 
for them, participants needed to evaluate potential food items. Based on the prescreen 
ratings, two evaluated food items that were as close as possible in their evaluation (either 
equally positive or equally negative) were identified for each participant prior to their 
arrival in the lab. Each participant was randomly assigned to the positive-choice or 
negative-choice condition (the favorable or unfavorable food condition). On the seven 
point scales, items rated 5 or 6 were considered positive ratings, and items rated 2 or 3 
were considered negative ratings. Out of the 37 items rated in prescreening and being 
randomly assigned to a condition, two food options were chosen as the equally liked or 
equally disliked ones. 18 other food items were fillers. Each item was evaluated on a 
seven point scale on liking (1= extremely dislike, 7= extremely like), tastiness (1= 
extremely untasty, 7= extremely tasty), and health (1=extremely unhealthy, 7=extremely 
healthy). These were averaged for the pre-choice rating. Participants were then asked to 
choose between the initially equally liked or disliked options as determined from 
prescreening. After the choice, they were asked to report their level of discomfort and 
then to re-evaluate the two choice options on liking (1-7 again) which served as the post-
choice rating.   
C. Independent variables. 
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Condition. Using a random number generator, participants were randomly 
assigned to their condition (1 or 2). Condition 1 was the positive-choice condition and 
condition 2 was the negative-choice condition. 
D. Dependent variables. 
Spreading of alternatives. Spreading of alternatives was calculated based on shifts 
from the pre-choice to post-choice ratings for both the chosen option and the rejected 
one. The shifts in chosen were the chosen pre-choice ratings (the average of liking, 
tastiness, and healthiness) subtracted from the chosen post-choice ratings (ChoPost-
ChoPre). The shifts in rejected were the rejected pre-choice ratings subtracted from the 
rejected post-choice ratings (RejPost-RejPre). Spreading was the difference in shifts for 
the chosen and rejected options (ChosenShift – RejectedShift) or [(ChoPost-ChoPre) - 
(RejPost-RejPre)].  
Discomfort. Discomfort was calculated by taking the average of five ratings. The 
ratings were from 1-7 for soothed/irritated, calm/anxious, comfortable/uncomfortable, 
easy/uneasy, and unbothered/bothered (cf. Elliot & Devine, 1994). Higher numerical 
scores indicate higher discomfort and lower numerical scores indicate lower discomfort.  
Distance. Distance was the absolute value of the difference of the ratings of the 
two choice items made in the lab prior to making the choice.  
Results 
 Spreading of alternatives. As mentioned previously, shifting in chosen and 
rejected options made up the spreading of alternatives. Spreading did occur, as seen in the 
table and figures below. The significance of overall spreading was tested by conducting a 
single-sample t-test on the spreading index. Spreading was significantly positive, M = 
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.962, t(103) = 5.51, p < .001. Spreading occurred close to equally across the positive-
choice condition (M=.896, SD= 1.51) and the negative-choice condition (M=1.018, 
SD=1.995), t(102) = -.347, p = .729 (see Figures 2, 3). 
In addition to the presence of overall spreading, there was a pattern suggesting 
that the shifts may be primarily driven by those options and actions that might be 
expected to create the most dissonance. In an analysis of the components of spreading, 
the shifts in the chosen option, there was more of a shift in the negative-choice condition 
(M=.4643, SD= 1.93) than in the positive-choice condition (M= -.1042, SD= 1.60), but 
the difference did not reach significance t(102) = -1.616, p=.109. For shifts in the rejected 
option, there was less of a shift in the negative-choice condition (M= -.55, SD=1.264) 
than in the positive-choice condition (M= -1.00, SD= 1.62), but the difference was also 
not significant there, t(102)= -1.575, p=.118. In both cases, however, the larger shift was 
in the condition where that shift would address the element of the choice that could create 
dissonance (i.e., foregoing a favorable option or accepting an unfavorable option). Thus, 
one might consider the locus of the spreading to be largely consistent with overall 
dissonance-based predictions. 
The results involving distance of the pre-choice evaluations were not very 
supportive of dissonance. Distance was not a predictor of the amount of spreading in the 
positive-choice condition, F(1, 46) = 2.597, p = .114, but it was in the negative-choice 
condition, F(1, 54) = 23.147, p < .001. In the positive condition, distance was in the 
positive direction (b=.77), inconsistent with dissonance theory as larger numbers of 
distance indicates that the scores are further apart (meaning that in this case dissonance is 
increasing when the distance increases- a less difficult choice). In the negative condition, 
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there was a negative relationship (b=-.91) where, as distance increased, dissonance 
decreased. This does support dissonance theory where, as distance increases (pre-choice 
ratings are further apart, making an easier choice) discomfort decreases. 
 
Figure 2. Mean scores for the chosen and rejected pre-choice and post-choice ratings, broken up 
by condition 1 (positive) and 2 (negative.) 
 
                            
Figure 3. Graph of mean scores for the chosen and rejected pre-choice and post-choice ratings, 
showing spreading of alternatives. 
 
Discomfort. Overall, the discomfort measures were highly correlated (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .912), so they were combined into a composite measure of discomfort. As 
anticipated, there was more discomfort in the negative-choice condition (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.43) than the positive-choice condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.76), but the two conditions did 
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not differ significantly, t(102) = -1.61, p = .11). Distance of the two pre-choice ratings 
was not a significant predictor of discomfort in either the positive-choice condition, F(1, 
46) = 1.473, p = .231, or the negative-choice condition, F(1, 54) = .369, p = .546, nor did 
it overall F(1, 102) = .372, p < .554. It was in a positive direction (b=.084), so when the 
two options are farther apart from one another, the more discomfort was experienced, not 
in alignment with dissonance theory.  
Relations between discomfort and spreading. Discomfort did not predict 
spreading in the positive-choice, F(1, 46) = 1.66, p = .204) or negative-choice condition, 
F(1, 54) = 1.515, p = .224). In breaking apart the spreading of alternatives, discomfort did 
predict the shifts from pre- to post-choice ratings of the chosen alternative in both the 
positive-choice condition, F(1, 46) = 11.608, p = .001, and negative-choice condition, 
F(1, 54) = 4.347, p = .042. Across conditions, shifts in the chosen option were also 
significantly predicted by discomfort, F(1, 102) = 10.42, p = .002. However, in both 
conditions and overall, the relation between discomfort and the chosen shift was negative 
[positive (b=-.61), negative (b=-.37), overall (b= -.41)]. That is, more discomfort was 
associated with less positive shifts – a direction opposite to dissonance-based spreading. 
Results were a bit different for shifts in the rejected option, though. Discomfort did not 
significantly predict the shifts, F(1, 102) = 3.268, p = .074. Here, however, a negative 
direction also presents itself where more discomfort was associated with more negative 
shifts of the rejected option – a direction consistent with dissonance-based spreading. 
Discomfort also was not a significant predictor of shifts in the rejected option within each 
choice condition [positive-choice condition, F(1, 46) = 3.6, p = .084, and negative-choice 
condition, F(1, 54) = 1.367, p = .248]. These, too, produced negative relations between 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 18 
discomfort and shifts in the rejected option. The direction of each of these was consistent 
with potential dissonance-based spreading, but the relation that was closer to significant 
was for the choice that I thought might produce less dissonance overall (i.e., a choice 
between two positive options).  
Discussion 
 At the outset of this research, two questions were posed: whether discomfort was 
responsible for post-choice spreading of alternatives and whether pre-choice valence of 
the choice options impacts post-choice spreading of alternatives. In the current study at 
least, discomfort and spreading did occur. However, discomfort was not connected to the 
pre- to post-choice shifts in evaluation in the ways that would make dissonance a clear 
explanation for all of the observed spreading of alternatives. In reference to criticisms of 
dissonance-based explanations for spreading (Chen and Risen, 2010; Bem, 1967), there 
could be a number of reasons why spreading might occur even in the absence of 
dissonance-based discomfort. Thus, overall, some of the results of this study might 
support dissonance explanations (Festinger, 1957) or alternative mechanisms that do not 
produce dissonance as part of attitude change (e.g., Bem, 1967). 
In support of cognitive dissonance theory, psychological discomfort is occurring, 
especially when the choice is between two less than desirable options. Also, in 
comparison with participants’ own pre-choice ratings, there is post-choice spreading of 
alternatives (seen most clearly in the graph of chosen/rejected mean scores).  
However, spreading of alternatives as explained by Brehm (1956) was not 
predicted by the amount of discomfort experienced when making a difficult choice. As 
the psychological tension is the central basis for cognitive dissonance theory and aspects 
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of spreading of alternatives have been critiqued by Chen and Risen (2010), this could 
support self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). An additional confusing aspect of the results 
is that distance did not predict discomfort in either condition (though it did overall, and 
the direction in which it relates within each condition does support dissonance theory in 
the negative condition, but not in the positive). Distance of the initial ratings of choice 
items did not predict post-choice discomfort. The relations are mostly positive so that as 
distance increases, discomfort increases - inconsistent with dissonance theory. In other 
words, according to Dissonance Throry, the harder the choice, the more psychological 
discomfort should occur after choosing one of the two options. However, that was not 
generally true. Despite this, many instances of inconsistent relations with dissonance 
theory are non-significant, making it difficult to confidently conclude that they do not 
support dissonance theory. Additionally, some of these non-significant results could be 
coming from unequal pre-choice evaluations of the two choice objects in the negative-
option condition (as seen in Figure 3). 
Additionally, many of the food options could have been perceived as relatively 
positive (or liked) options, which made it difficult to create sufficiently (and equally) 
negative (disliked) pairs of options (as seen in Table 1). Thus, adding more negative food 
items might have been useful for the negative condition. Another potential flaw in the 
method could also be creating non-significant results. The five dissonance measures used 
to create mean discomfort come from counter-attitudinal essay studies conducted by 
Elliot and Devine (1994). Their study used over 20 different discomfort items, whereas 
the current study used only five. Perhaps the five that were chosen were not as well suited 
to discomfort following choice as they were for discomfort following essay writing. 
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When breaking down each discomfort measure used, the only one that significantly 
predicted spreading was unbothered/bothered. However, it was in a negative direction 
(b=-.227). Thus, there was little indication that the discomfort measure produced results 
consistent with dissonance theory. Overall, it is possible that the measures might have 
tapped into more general unease (e.g., by having to consider negative options) rather than 
discomfort from the difficulty of the choice itself.  
The current research outcomes create a bit of a dilemma. Both dissonance and 
alternative theories attempt to explain the same experience. The results, however, fit in 
some ways with dissonance and not in others. The data are not as straightforward as 
dissonance holding for some types of decisions and self-perception for others, however, 
as some patterns within the same decisions seem potentially consistent with dissonance 
but others are not. This makes one consider potential problems with the study that could 
be impacting the data. The sample size for each condition was not large, and food options 
may not be creating enough dissonance to create a strong pattern, even if participants 
believed that they were choosing items they would have to later taste. Thus, one issue 
may concern whether alternative methods might have produced stronger experiences of 
discomfort.  
Another potential issue may concern the timing of the various measurements. Past 
research suggests that the feeling of regret immediately after the decision might make 
people focus on negative features of the chosen option or on positive features of the 
rejected option. Walster and Walster (1970) argued that more such regret should be 
experienced when choosing between more negative choice options. Regretting one’s 
choice, though, could push one toward devaluing the chosen option and valuing the 
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rejected option, especially if post-choice evaluations are taken before dissonance takes 
hold. That is, from a dissonance perspective, initial regret should give way to dissonance-
based discomfort and efforts to reduce the discomfort. As a result, it seems possible that 
the discomfort measure might be partly picking up regret, and slightly different timing of 
the discomfort measure might provide more consistent relations with shifts in the relevant 
evaluations. As the measure of discomfort constitutes the primary avenue to provide 
unique support for dissonance theory, future research should deal carefully with the 
structure and timing of the discomfort measure. On a related note, the timing of the post-
choice evaluations could also be affected by immediate post-choice regret and provide 
less consistent patterns than might come about with a bit more time for dissonance to take 
hold. 
Therefore, it seems that this study has data supporting both dissonance theory and 
alternative theories, making it difficult to clearly state which is the origin of spreading of 
alternatives. It may well be that spreading can sometimes reflect efforts to reduce 
dissonance-based discomfort and sometimes reflect other more purely cognitive 
processes. Future research must be done to provide clarifying results to explain the cause 
of spreading. 
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